Wayne State University
Chemical Engineering and Materials Science
Faculty Research Publications

Chemical Engineering and Materials Science

7-31-2019

Process/Equipment Design Implications for Control System
Cybersecurity
Helen Durand
Wayne State University, helen.durand@wayne.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/cems_eng_frp
Part of the Controls and Control Theory Commons, Information Security Commons, and the Process
Control and Systems Commons

Recommended Citation
Durand, Helen, "Process/Equipment Design Implications for Control System Cybersecurity" (2019).
Chemical Engineering and Materials Science Faculty Research Publications. 7.
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/cems_eng_frp/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Chemical Engineering and Materials Science at
DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chemical Engineering and Materials Science
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.

PROCESS/EQUIPMENT DESIGN IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTROL SYSTEM
CYBERSECURITY
Helen Durand ∗
Wayne State University
Detroit, MI 48202

Abstract
An emerging challenge for process safety is process control system cybersecurity. An attacker could gain control
of the process actuators through the control system or communication policies within control loops and potentially
drive the process state to unsafe conditions. Cybersecurity has traditionally been handled as an information technology
(IT) problem in the process industries. In the literature for cybersecurity specifically of control systems, there has
been work aimed at developing control designs that seek to fight cyberattacks by either giving the system appropriate
response mechanisms once attacks are detected or seeking to make the attacks difficult to perform. In this work,
we begin an exploration into the implications of process and equipment design for enhancing the ability of chemical
processes to maintain safe operation during cyberattacks on the process control systems.

Keywords
Process control, process design, cybersecurity, process operational safety.
plant workers and community members), the direction to pursue to make plants cyberattack-resilient within a framework
Significant research work with regard to enhancing pro- that is attractive to industry is not currently clear. Recent
cess operational safety through control design has appeared advances with respect to preventing control system cyberatin recent years (e.g., Albalawi et al. [2018]). In these recent tacks from succeeding have focused on cyberattack detecworks, safety issues can occur due to a variety of causes, tion Satchidanandan and Kumar [2017] and also control of
such as large disturbances Zhang et al. [2018]. Safety inci- systems during attacks Zhu and Başar [2015].
dents which can be caused by cyberattacks on control sysIn a recent work Durand [2018], we have defined
tems have also received focus recently Wu et al. [2018]. Cy- cyberattack-resilience of a control system in a nonlinear sysbersecurity breaches of process control systems at chemical tems framework to mean that there exist no inputs which can
processing facilities could create significant safety hazards drive the closed-loop state out of the set of safe operating
for plant workers and residents of communities around such conditions. Developing viable processes which meet this defprocessing facilities. A traditional approach to preventing inition, if it is possible, will require more than control system
cyberattacks from causing safety issues at chemical plants is advances. In the remainder of this work, we begin an analto augment IT defenses (by, for example, employing firewalls ysis of the role of process and equipment design in realizing
and applying software patches) to reduce the ability of attack- operational safety in the face of cyberattacks.
ers to impact process safety. However, IT defenses have limitations and are not guaranteed to prevent cyberattacks from
being successful. Solutions which modify the communica- Preliminaries
tion/networking channels in control loops so that they are not Notation
susceptible to cyberattacks could form a part of the solution;
The notation | · | signifies the Euclidean norm of a vector.
however, the trend in the chemical process industries away
T
from more secure wired communication to wireless com- x signifies the transpose of a vector x. We define tk = k∆,
munication indicates that cybersecurity solutions which are where ∆ refers to the sampling period and k = 0, 1, . . ..
cumbersome and prevent companies from taking advantage diag(x) represents a matrix with the components of the vecof advances in computing are not the options of interest to tor x on its diagonal.
industry. Despite the high stakes involved in cyberattacks
(i.e., the potential for an attack to cause the deaths of many Class of Systems
Introduction

∗

We consider classes of process systems of the form:
To whom all correspondence should be addressed, Email: helen.durand@wayne.edu.

ẋ = f (x, u, w)

(1)

where x ∈ X ⊂ Rn represents the process state vector,
u ∈ U ⊂ Rm represents the process input vector, and
w ∈ W ⊂ Rz represents the vector of bounded process disturbances (i.e., W := {w ∈ Rz | |w| ≤ θ, θ > 0}). f is a
nonlinear, locally Lipschitz vector function of its arguments.
We consider that f (0, 0, 0) = 0 and that X is the set of safe
states (i.e., if x ∈ X, ∀ t ≥ 0, no process incidents occur).
Model Predictive Control
Model predictive control (MPC) is an optimization-based
control design which solves the following optimization problem at every sampling time tk :
∫ tk+N
Le (x̃(τ ), u(τ )) dτ
(2a)
min
u(t)∈S(∆)

tk

˙
s.t. x̃(t)
= f (x̃(t), u(t), 0)

(2b)

x̃(tk ) = x(tk )

(2c)

x̃(t) ∈ X, ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

(2d)

u(t) ∈ U, ∀ t ∈ [tk , tk+N )

(2e)

sor measurement falsification is achieved is in the case that
the operating steady-state is open-loop stable, such that the
open-loop stable input (which is independent of feedback and
therefore independent of the process sensors) can be utilized
to drive the closed-loop state to the steady-state regardless of
whether an attacker can modify the sensor readings or not.
The fact that the success of this approach relies on a lack of
feedback indicates that it is difficult to conceive of control
designs which utilize feedback but do not produce problematic inputs when state measurements are falsified. Another
concept that has been explored for utilizing controllers in
preventing cyberattacks from being successful has involved
controller or instrumentation reconfiguration after an attack
is detected. A difficulty with this approach is that detection
of the attack, a pre-requisite to switching to a control strategy
which maintains safe operation during the attack, requires
some expectation of what the attacks will target, so that metrics related to the expected target can be monitored. Given
the complexity of large-scale chemical plants and interactions between units, determining all of the types of attack
targets may be difficult. In conclusion, there are many methods for evading control-focused efforts for preventing safety
issues due to cyberattacks.

In Eq. (2), u(t) ∈ S(∆) signifies that the input trajectory
is a vector of piecewise-constant inputs held for periods ∆.
The stage cost Le (x, u) is optimized (Eq. (2a)) subject to
the nominal (w ≡ 0) dynamic model of Eq. (2b), the state The Roles of Process Design and Equipment Design in Premeasurement of Eq. (2c), the state constraint of Eq. (2d), and venting Safety Issues Arising from Cyberattacks
the input constraint of Eq. (2e).
Despite that control designs are not expected to be capable of preventing safety incidents in various cyberattack sceOn the Role of Design in Preventing Cyberattack Success narios, appropriate process designs and equipment designs
may aid in preventing the success of cyberattacks. At this
In this section, we demonstrate conceptually that the suc- point, it is not clear how conservative designs may need to be
cess of cyberattacks on process control systems cannot be to prevent the success of cyberattacks. In this work, however,
fully prevented at the control design level, but that process we do not focus on design conservatism, but rather on elucidesign, as well as equipment design and selection, have the dating the manner in which process and equipment designs
potential to prevent certain attack types which could jeopar- relate to the success or failure of cyberattacks.
dize alternative designs from succeeding. We utilize a nuTo demonstrate that process designs can play a key role
merical example and a process example involving two con- in preventing the success of cyberattacks, consider a vessel
tinuous stirred tank reactors (CSTR’s) and a separator to aid in which a runaway reaction could occur (e.g., Zhang et al.
in clarifying and drawing several conclusions with respect to [2018]), causing the pressure in the vessel to build up such
the role of design in preventing the success of cyberattacks that an explosion takes place if sufficient cooling is not proon process control systems. Throughout this work, we con- vided. One could imagine that if the coolant flow rate were a
sider cyberattack-resilience to mean that no safety issues oc- manipulated input, a cyberattacker might seek to gain control
cur during a cyberattack (i.e., x(t) ∈ X, t ≥ 0, even under a of this input and then set it artificially low so that the approcyberattack).
priate cooling is not provided as the reaction takes place. If
this were to result in an increase in pressure in the vessel, but
The Inadequacy of Control Laws for Preventing Safety Issues the vessel were instrumented with a safety relief valve, the
Arising from Cyberattacks
attack may not be able to create an explosion.
Cyberattacks may target a variety of communication
With regard to equipment design/selection, the majority
channels within feedback control loops, including the com- of attacks intended to impact process safety which can be
munication between the sensors and controller, and also be- conceived are intended to impact process equipment fidelity,
tween the controller and the actuators. Attacks of the lat- including the situation in the above paragraph in which a runter type bypass controllers in a feedback loop completely away reaction is initiated with the intent of compromising the
and therefore cannot be stopped by adjusting the control sys- reactor vessel. A successful cyberattack on the control system design. In Durand [2018], we explored several different tem in a uranium enrichment plant in Iran via the Stuxnet
MPC designs with respect to whether they are resilient to worm was also geared toward compromising equipment (it
cyberattacks in which false state measurement information spun centrifuges at the plant at speeds that damaged them Fiwas provided to the MPC’s at each sampling time. A case in dler [2011]). One of the challenges with respect to anawhich cyberattack-resilience of a control system against sen- lyzing equipment fidelity for chemical processes under at-

Cybersecurity and Process Equipment Design: A Numerical
Example
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tacks is that there are many mechanisms of failure of equipment Dowling [2013], and equipment is typically designed to
withstand expected loading during operation. Cyberattacks
may create unexpected loading for which the equipment was
not designed; however, determining all of the types of unexpected loading to which equipment might be subjected via
rogue control actions can be challenging.
In the following sections, we present a numerical example that illustrates the concept of designing equipment to be
cyberattack-resilient. Subsequently, we analyze a chemical
process example that suggests initial steps for characterizing whether a process/equipment design inhibits cyberattack
success or not.

300
200
100
0

Time (hr)

Figure 1. States over one hour of operation for the process
In this section, we provide a numerical example to illus- of Eqs. (3)-(4) under EMPC with a sensor attack.
trate the concept that equipment designs might be selected
to prevent certain cyberattacks from being successful. The K and remains at that temperature long enough for the pipe
example is based on a case study from Durand [in press] in temperature to also exceed 11.8 K above Ts . Furthermore,
which a continuous stirred tank reactor (CSTR) is followed it will yield (exceeding the yield strength will be considered
by a section of process piping that is rigidly fixed on the end undesirable for the part in this example) if the temperature of
that is closest to the CSTR outlet and has a bellows joint on the pipe wall exceeds Ts by about 278 K. The controller for
the opposite end, with spring constant ks . The following dy- the CSTR is an MPC which promotes steady-state operation
namic model describes the manner in which the concentra- with bounds on CA0 between 0.5 and 7.5 kmol/m3 and on
tion of the reactant A (which is converted to B in the CSTR) Q between −5 × 105 and 5 × 105 kJ/h, with a stage cost as
and temperature T in the reactor change over time as the val- follows:
ues of inlet reactant concentration CA0 and heat rate Q are
Le =100(CA − CAs )2 + (T − Ts )2
modified:
(5)
+ (CA0 − CA0s )2 + 10−10 (Q − Qs )2
E
F
−
2
ĊA = (CA0 − CA ) − k0 e Rg T CA
(3)
The controller parameters are N = 10 and ∆ = 0.01 h. The
V
optimization problem of the MPC was solved using MAT∆Hk0 − REg T 2
Q
F
CA +
(4) LAB’s function fmincon. The process of Eqs. (3)-(4) is simṪ = (T0 − T ) −
e
V
ρL Cp
ρL Cp V
ulated under this controller with an integration step of 10−4
where F , V , k0 , E, Rg , ∆H, ρL , and Cp represent, respec- h, and in the absence of an attack, the closed-loop state
tively, the flow rate into and out of the CSTR, the CSTR vol- is driven to the steady-state with CA = CAs , T = Ts ,
ume, the pre-exponential constant, the activation energy of CA0 = CA0s , and Q = Qs from an initial condition at
the reaction, the ideal gas constant, the enthalpy of reaction, CA − CAs = −0.4 kmol/m3 and T − Ts = 8 K. If an atthe liquid density, and the heat capacity of the liquid in the tack is performed that provides, for example, the same false
CSTR. The values of the parameters can be found in Durand state measurement at every sampling time for 100 sampling
[in press].
times of CA (tk ) = 0.05 kmol/m3 and T (tk ) = 440 K, then
The piping element has a yield strength of 270 MPa, the trajectory in Fig. 1 is obtained. In this case, the tempera thermal expansion coefficient of 12.5 × 10−6 K−1 , a ature of the fluid leaving the CSTR exceeds its steady-state
Young’s Modulus of 200 GPa, and a cross-sectional area value by 320 K. If the piping element comes to equilibrium
A = 0.002041 m2 Barron and Barron [2012]. A safety factor with the fluid temperature at this condition, then the stress
of 2.7 is used in setting the design stress (which is set to 108 in the pipe will be beyond that required to cause yielding.
Pa and is the value of the stress which it is desired that the This occurs even though the material from which the CSTR
stress in the pipe not exceed). Consider that the initial ma- itself is made is able to withstand the high temperature in the
terials selection for the CSTR allows the CSTR to withstand CSTR.
If the fact that the piping could be compromised by the
temperatures up to 400 K above the operating steady-state
temperature, but that the initial design for the piping uses an proposed cyberattack was discovered before construction of
unusually stiff bellows joint with ks = 5.5 × 107 N/m. With the equipment through numerical simulations, one technique
this bellows joint, the stress in the piping element will ex- for preventing the cyberattack described from causing failceed the design stress if the temperature of the piping exceeds ure of the piping would be to select a less stiff bellows
about 11.8 K above the steady-state value Ts of the temper- joint. For example, if the bellows joint was selected to have
ature of the CSTR outlet. We consider that the piping is in- ks = 4.4×105 N/m (noted by Barron and Barron [2012] to be
sulated such that it could reach these high temperatures if the a more typical value of spring bellows constants), the tempertemperature of the fluid exiting the CSTR exceeds Ts by 11.8 ature of the pipe would need to be about 39,410 K above Ts ,

a case which would never be expected in practice, before the
yield strength would be reached. With that spring constant, if
an attack is performed on the MPC in which CA (tk ) = 0.05
kmol/m3 and T (tk ) = 440 K at every sampling period, then
neither the maximum temperature allowable in the CSTR or
in the piping is exceeded in the one hour of operation according to Fig. 1. As a steady-state temperature (different from
Ts ) appears to have been reached by the end of one hour
of operation in Fig. 1, one could conclude that the equipment design is now resilient against the specific cyberattack
in which CA (tk ) = 0.05 kmol/m3 and T (tk ) = 440 K at
every sampling time.

withstand cyberattacks is demonstrated to be achievable in
this example suggests that that the potential of equipment or
process designs to withstand cyberattacks may be a worthwhile consideration during process hazard analysis.
Cyberattacks and Process Design: A Chemical Process Example

In the process example in this section, we move from investigating the impacts of equipment design on cybersecurity
to investigating the impacts of process design. To do so, we
consider the process example from Lao et al. [2013] in which
two CSTR’s in series are followed by a flash drum. CSTR’s
To determine whether this new equipment design is 1 and 2 (Vessels 1 and 2, respectively) receive fresh feed of
cyberattack-resilient against any cyberattacks which could be the reactant A at concentrations CA10 and CA20 at flow rates
performed, one could begin testing various types of attacks to F10 and F20 , respectively. The first CSTR also receives a
see whether any of them appears to be capable of compromis- recycle stream of condensed vapor from the overhead of the
ing the equipment. For example, if instead an attack is per- flash drum (Vessel 3) at flow rate Fr . The product stream
formed in which T (tk ) = 430 K, then the temperature at the F3 is the liquid condensed in the flash drum. Heat is supCSTR outlet becomes 547 K above its steady-state value after plied or removed from CSTR 1, CSTR 2, and the flash drum
1 h of operation. This temperature is now lower than the tem- at rates Q1 , Q2 , and Q3 , respectively. The model equations
perature at which the piping element would exceed the yield and parameters are those in Lao et al. [2013], with a slight
strength, but is now higher than the temperature which could change to the equations representing the concentrations CAr ,
cause failure of the CSTR. Though one could again modify CBr , and CCr of species A, B, and C in the recycle stream
the equipment design to prevent failure of the CSTR in this (where B is the desired product produced from A, and C is
attack scenario (perhaps modifying the material from which an undesired byproduct) as follows:
the CSTR is constructed), the process of trying an attack, assessing the outcome, and modifying equipment accordingly C = αj Cj3 , j = A, B, C, D
(6)
jr
Kd
is not straightforward. It lacks a systematic methodology for
generating attack scenarios to be used in testing the equipment fidelity. It may be difficult to postulate every possible where D is an inert material, αj is the relative volatility of
attack and how it may impact equipment, as attacks may be species j at the conditions in the flash drum, and Cji , i =
of various types (e.g., they may not only be those in which 1, 2, 3, is the concentration of species j in the liquid in Vessel
the sensor measurement is fixed at every sampling time, but i. Kd is computed as follows:
may change between sampling times and operate a process
∑C
C
∑
ρ − j=A Cj3 M Wj
αj Cj3
in a dynamic fashion). This means that even material fail- K = [
] + αD
(7)
d
ρM
MW D ρM
ure mechanisms which are related to dynamic behavior (e.g.,
j=A
fatigue) may also need to be considered.
This example has been numerically constructed (with where
∑C
some liberty taken in selecting equipment designs and allowC
∑
ρ − [ j=A Cj3 MW j ]
able maximum temperatures in the equipment that would not ρM =
+[
Cj3 ]
(8)
MW D
be expected to be appropriate in practice) to illustrate the conj=A
cept that equipment designs can play a role in the success of
cyberattacks, and that clever equipment designs may prevent where ρ is the density of the liquid in the flash drum, ρM is
some attacks that would otherwise compromise equipment the molar density (assumed for ease of modeling to be the
from being able to do so. It also clarifies that: 1) determining same for the liquid and vapor) in the flash drum, and MW j is
how attacks might impact equipment may be difficult given the molecular weight of species j. Two steady-states of the
the many different failure mechanisms of materials and the process will be of interest in the studies below for the state
many different types of attacks which could be performed vector x̄ = [T1 CA1 CB1 CC1 T2 CA2 CB2 CC2 T3 CA3 CB3
to make the various failure mechanisms relevant and 2) at a CC3 ]T , where Ti is the temperature in Vessel i: an open-loop
large-scale plant with connected units and coupled process unstable steady-state x̄u = [370.22 3.29 0.17 0.042 435.32
dynamics, attacks might be deployed which modify inputs to 2.74 0.45 0.11 435.15 2.88 0.50 0.12]T and an open-loop
one unit to seek to cause failure in another that is, perhaps, stable steady-state x̄s = [300.97 3.55 0.0035 0.00050 300.78
downstream (this is shown in the case of the first attack ex- 3.32 0.0029 0.00041 300.61 3.50 0.0033 0.00044]T (stabilamine above, where when ks = 5.5 × 107 N/m, the changes ity or instability was assumed from open-loop simulations).
in the manipulated inputs which directly impact the states of The steady-state values of the process manipulated inputs
the process fluid in the CSTR are utilized not to cause failure Q1 , Q2 , Q3 , and ∆F20 = (F20 − 5) m3 /h are zero. The
of the CSTR, but to impact the downstream piping). The fact CSTR is operated under an MPC where the lower and upper
that some level of analysis of the ability of the equipment to bounds on each heat rate input are −1×106 and 1×106 kJ/h,

(9)

where q is either u or s,
depending on
whether the process is to be operated around
the stable or unstable steady-state, and P
=
diag(20, 103 , 103 , 103 , 10, 103 , 103 , 103 , 10, 103 , 103 , 103 ).
The process model is integrated with an integration step
size of 10−5 h. It is operated for one hour with N = 6 and
∆ = 0.005 h. The MATLAB function fmincon is utilized in
solving the optimization problem.
We now analyze how two attacks on this process play
out differently to gain insights into how design impacts cybersecurity. Fig. 2 shows the results when an MPC which
incorporates a model of the three-unit process in Eq. (2b)
and has q = u in Eq. (9) is used to control the process
with recycle when it is initialized from xI = x̄q + [10 0.5
−0.001 −0.0001 −10 0.5 −0.001 −0.0001 10 0.5 −0.001
−0.0001]T with q = u, but the false state measurement
xF 1 provided at every sampling time is x̄u . By providing
the MPC with a state measurement corresponding to the operating steady-state, the MPC is tricked into computing the
steady-state control action, as this is the control action that
we would like it to compute if, in reality, the process state
is at the steady-state. Because the steady-state at which we
would like to stabilize the closed-loop state is open-loop unstable, when the inputs are fixed at the steady-state values by
the MPC but the process state is not at x̄u , the closed-loop
state does not approach x̄u but instead approaches a different (stable) steady-state with problematically high temperatures in the various units. The steady-state input provided
by the MPC is thus insufficient for driving the closed-loop
state back to x̄u during the attack. An important point about
this attack is that despite the fact that the system dynamics
in this case are more complex than those in, for example,
Eqs. (3)-(4), due to the multiple interconnected units and recycle, applying the steady-state input corresponding to an
open-loop unstable steady-state when the closed-loop state
is not initialized at that steady-state is an easy-to-recognize
attack strategy. It is also easy to figure out how to achieve
with the control design at hand, because it is well-known that
an MPC designed to track a steady-state will compute the
steady-state input if the state measurement is at the steadystate. This implies: 1) there may be some attacks which can
be readily identified during certain hazard assessments if criteria for recognizing these attacks (e.g., false state measurements which lead to open-loop unstable steady-state control
inputs being applied to a process when it is off the steadystate) are developed, and then the process can be protected
against such attacks via strategies in process/equipment design or detection/controller reconfiguration and 2) the fact
that the process dynamics are coupled, large-scale, or complex does not necessarily mean that it is difficult for an attacker to locate a method for successfully bringing the plant
to an unsafe condition.
Now consider that this same process is operated around

T1 − Ts (K)

2
+ 5 × 10−12 Q22 + 5 × 10−12 Q23 + 100∆F20
)

T2 − Ts (K)

Le = 105 ((x̄ − x̄q )P (x̄ − x̄q )T + 5 × 10−12 Q21

1000
500
0
0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

1000
0
-1000

T3 − Ts (K)

respectively, and the upper and lower bounds on ∆F20 are -5
and 5 m3 /h. The stage cost is
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Figure 2. T1 , T2 , and T3 over 1 h of operation for the 2
CSTR-flash drum process under a cyberattacked EMPC provided the false state measurement xF 1 .
the stable steady-state (i.e., q = s in the above problem formulation). In this case, the same type of cyberattack (i.e., x̄s
is the falsified input at every sampling time) does not succeed in causing a safety concern, because it causes the MPC
to compute open-loop stable inputs that drive the closed-loop
state to the open-loop stable steady-state. From a nonlinear
systems perspective, if there are multiple steady-states (as in
this example) for a given set of inputs, the set of initial states
around x̄s from which the steady-state input might be applied
and the closed-loop state would be driven to the origin is not
Rn . This suggests a (computationally-laborious) mechanism
for anticipating some of the conditions which might be set up
under a cyberattack on the process state measurements that
maintains these falsified sensor values constant throughout
the time of the attack. Specifically, for MPC, a characteristic
of attacks that present the same falsified state measurement at
every sampling time is that the MPC will compute the same
input at every sampling time. To analyze whether there exist
significant concerns with respect to a process and/or equipment design being susceptible to a cyberattack, a technique
that could be attempted would be to discretize the input space
between the input bounds as well as the state space and then
determine, for each point in the state-space, all steady-states
which can be found to be associated with each input combination in the input space. Subsequently, the worst-case scenarios revealed by this analysis could be analyzed to determine whether they indicate that problematic conditions are
likely to occur or not, and if so, how equipment or process
design might be adjusted to modify that. Despite the fact
that this technique does not explore dynamic behavior which
may be set up by cyberattacks and that it is likely to be computationally intractable with full process models, it suggests
the beginnings of a systematic approach to characterizing
whether a process is cyberattack-resilient.
The analysis with respect to the two cyberattacks on the
CSTR-CSTR-flash drum process as detailed above also provides insight into how cyberattacks should and should not be
understood. For example, the heat inputs applied at every
sampling time in Fig. 2 are zero, and yet the temperatures in

every vessel increased significantly because the initial condition was one in which the reactant A was present in the two
CSTR’s and converted to the products with no heat removed
from the vessel as the exothermic reactions took place. The
reason that that cyberattack succeeds is a combination of the
initial condition and how the inputs applied from the process
condition drive it to an unsafe operating condition by taking
advantage of the physics of the process. The manner in which
attacks succeed is not the result only of the inputs which the
attacker applies (e.g., it is not necessarily true that Q1 must
become large for T1 to become large), but of the direction in
which these inputs drive the process given the process state
when the actions begin to be applied. As noted in Durand
[2018], the results of attacks may be difficult to predict in
many cases, as the results would be state trajectories for coupled nonlinear systems under various input trajectories.

attacks introduce transients even into processes which might
otherwise be operated at steady-state, an interesting future
direction could be to explore whether there may exist novel
process and equipment designs that are not necessarily developed for a steady-state paradigm and which may allow for
greater economic benefits with cyberattack-resilience beyond
what can be achieved in traditional paradigms. It may also
be interesting to consider the extent to which design-based
cyberattack-resilience considerations might be extended to
make processes resilient (from a process safety perspective)
to actuator and sensor faults, as the techniques for developing
resilience that have been described above are independent of
sensor measurements and are related only to whether the actuator outputs are within their bounds, and not to the exact
value that they take within their bounds.

An important question which remains to be addressed for
the example above is how the design might be modified in
light of the realization that a cyberattack could be easily performed on the system. Part of the reason why the cyberattack
can be easily performed is that the desired operating conditions correspond to an unstable steady-state for the system.
The steady-state is unstable due to the process dynamics. An
interesting future research direction could be exploring techniques for modifying designs while maintaining the operating steady-state as a process steady-state (but perhaps modifying its stability). One could also consider adding safety
systems Ahooyi et al. [2016] which are physically activated
when the conditions of the process reach certain values, before an unsafe but stable steady-state is reached, essentially
using a strategy which switches the process dynamics automatically when the inputs are not as expected, in an attempt to cause the modified dynamics to prevent the safety issues. Selecting equipment that results in tighter input bounds
might also be an option. It would be expected that equipment
with more significant limitations (i.e., smaller ranges of allowable inputs) would prevent the worst-case scenarios from
deviating too much from the steady-state conditions. However, small ranges for the allowable inputs may negatively
impact the ability of the control system to be flexible and to
reject disturbances. In summary, techniques are needed for
considering designs and changes in designs within a dynamic
systems framework.
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it requires significant conservatism that reduces the economic
attractiveness of processes. Motivated by the fact that cyber-
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